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Abstract. I postulate that social norms and individuals’ behaviors are shaped by a
common process capable of generating a multitude of outcomes. In games of friendship
links and behaviors, I propose k-player Nash stability—a family of equilibria, indexed by a
measure of robustness given by the number of permitted link changes, which is (ordinally
and cardinally) ranked in a probabilistic sense. Application of the proposed framework
to adolescents’ tobacco smoking and friendship decisions suggests that: (a.) friendship
networks respond to increases of tobacco prices and this response amplifies the intended
policy effect on smoking, (b.) racially desegregating high-schools, via stimulating the
social interactions of students with different intrinsic propensity to smoke, decreases the
overall smoking prevalence, (c.) adolescents are averse to sharing friends so that there is a
rivalry for friendships, (d.) when data on individuals’ friendship network is not available,
the importance of price centered policy tools is underestimated.
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1 Introduction
Arguably human beings are both products and creators of their social environments. Humans
engage in a complex system of social relations, also known as social interactions, which
determine their social environment, influence their socio-economic choices, and affect the
market outcomes. It has been largely overlooked, however, that the converse is also true:
humans’ behaviors also shape their social environment, and this paper explores the two-way
interplay between individuals’ behaviors and individuals’ social environment defined by their
friendship network.
I postulate that social norms and behaviors are shaped jointly by a common process
capable of generating a wide range of outcomes. The complexity of this process is naturally
captured by a game of link and node statuses, and this paper contributes the understanding
of the (non-linear) interplay between individuals’ decisions to form friendships and engage in
risky behaviors in three dimensions: (i) by proposing a general family of equilibria–outcomes
which are likely to arise and persists—in settings where individuals jointly choose actions
and linking strategies, (ii) by obtaining both ordinal and cardinal probabilistic ranking of
these equilibria which ranking has broader implications including for both the estimation of
and simulations from the proposed model, and (iii) by presenting empirical evidence that:
(a.) friendship networks respond to policies narrowly targeting tobacco smoking such as
tobacco price increase, and this response amplifies the intended policy effects on smoking,
(b.) racially desegregating high-schools, via stimulating the social interactions of students
with widely different intrinsic propensity to smoke, decreases the overall smoking prevalence,
(c.) adolescents are averse to sharing common friends so that there is a rivalry for friendships,
(d.) the estimates of the effect of price on tobacco smoking is understated in both cases when
data on individuals’ friendship network is not available or when the model does not account
for the response of the friendship network to changes in tobacco prices.
Friends’ influences have often been pointed to as a major driver of human behaviors
and have been associated with the potential to create a domino effect.1 The main premise
of this paper is that it it possible a converse mechanism to be in place where a change
of individual A decisions re-shapes who her peers are as opposed to pressure her peers to
follow A’s decisions, e.g. an individual who ceases smoking (after an increase of tobacco
prices) may reconsider her friendship network! To analyze the potential of this two-way effect
then we need a model in which individuals decide on both their friendships and behaviors
(decisions to smoke). Importantly, this model ought to acknowledge the possible externalities
between both smokers and their peers, and also between peers themselves, e.g. peers may
be rivals for friends. Relatedly and in addition, the model will need a coherent notion
of equilibrium adequately describing agents behavior (in these settings) which, ideally, is
1See Leibenstein (1950) for an early discussion.
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suitable for inference. In short, a suitable model ought to handle explicitly (vs assume away)
the possibility for multiple equilibria, inherited from the presence of externalities, and the
complexity of the equilibrium play, inherited from the complexity of the decision environment.
In a friendship network, if agents make choices in their best interest, which patterns of
links and behaviors are likely to prevail? Given an agent’s incentives, her observed links and
behaviors are likely to compare favorably against her alternatives, i.e. are likely to be robust
against a set of feasible deviations. Considerations related to the complexity of individuals’
decision problem could lend support to restricting the set of permissible deviations to local
ones.2 Reasoning about the diameter of these local deviations, however, has not fallen in the
focus of extant research and motivates us to introduce a class of (non-cooperative) equilibria
indexed by the diameter of the permissible local deviations. For a population of size n, k-
player Nash stability (k-PS) as a configuration of links and node statuses where any subset
of k players is in a Nash equilibrium of the induced game between these k players when
only the friendships between the k players are decided together with their action statuses.
Consequently, in a k-player Nash stable network state, no player has an incentive to alter
simultaneously k − 1 of his friendships and his action. For k < n, k-PS is less demanding
on the players in comparison with a Nash play (i.e., when k = n) and is, therefore, a more
tenable assumption in large population games. When k increases from 2 to n − 1, the k-PS
family gradually fills in the gap between the local stability argument of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) and the Nash play discussed in Bala and Goyal (2000).
In parallel to k-PS, I introduce the k-player dynamic (k-PD), a family of myopic dynamic
processes which not only offers a “mass action” interpretation of k-PS (as opposed to k-PS
arising from a complex reasoning process, Nash, 1950) but also delivers, cardinal and ordinal,
probabilistic ranking of the entire equilibrium family.3 In a k-PD, every period an individual
meets k − 1 potential friends and decides whether or not to befriend each of them as well as
whether to revise her action choice. The k-PD family induces a stationary distribution over
the entire set of possible outcomes which embeds the family of k-PS in an intuitive way (each
k-PS is k-neighborhood local mode of the stationary distribution) and which, because of its
invariance to k, ranks probabilistically each equilibrium within the family, even for different
k-s. In addition to the cardinal ranking, the analysis of the k-PD independently delivers, as
a by-product, a re-affirmative ordinal ranking of these equilibria. The larger k is, the faster
k-PDs approach the stationary distribution, i.e. the more likely is the stationary distribution
to represent those k-PDs, and the more probable the rest points of these k-PDs (of course
2There are 2n−1 possible link deviations and only n − 1 possible one-link-at-a-time link deviations.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) propose a notion of stability where the presence of a link implies that none
of the parties involved has unilateral incentive to sever this link. Though, severing multiple links are not
contemplated.
3See the seminal papers of Foster and Young (1990), Kandori et al. (1993); Blume (1993);
Jackson and Watts (2002). Some of the ideas I exploit are encountered in Cournot (1838, Chapter VII).
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k-PS states) are.
The convergence properties of k-PD have immediate implications for the implementation
of the proposed model. The model’s likelihood is given by the (unique) stationary distribution
of the k-PD family. This distribution pertains to the Exponential Random Graph Models4,
for which both direct estimation and simulating from the model with known parameters are
computationally infeasible.5 For these models the double Metropolis-Hastings sampler offers
a Bayesian estimation strategy, which nevertheless rely on simulations from the stationary
distribution via Markov chains.6 Importantly, in my settings, these Markov chains can be
readily simulated via the k-PD family, whose varying convergence rates offer a way to break
the poor convergence properties associated with local Markov chains.7 The particular novelty
is that k-PD justifies sampling from the stationary distribution with varying k on the support
{2, . . . , n− 1}, speeding the convergence of the proposed algorithm.
The model is estimated with data on smoking behavior, friendship networks, and home
environment (parental education background and parental smoking behavior) from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health.8 This is a longitudinal study of a nationally
representative sample of adolescents in the United States, who were in grades 7–12 during the
1994–95 school year. The estimation results confirm the leading role of the home environment
in shaping adolescents’ risky behaviors. Among the drivers of individuals decision a major
factor is their home environment: the presence of a smoker in the household increases (on
average) the likelihood of an adolescent smoking by 12.4 ppt. In addition, if the student’s
mother has completed high school or college, this likelihood falls (on average) by 4.8.
The estimation exercise also reveals an intricate non-linearities pertaining to the returns
and rivalries from friendships. In particular, adolescents prefer exclusive friendships as op-
posed to sharing friends which is consistent with rivalry for time spent with common friends.
Importantly, this rivalry can be uncovered only after the model accounts for the nonlinear re-
turns to friendships, i.e. each additional friendship may bring increasing/decreasing marginal
utility.9 In addition, estimates of the price coefficient on smoking which do not rely on data
from the friendship network point to the presence of intricate (non-linear) relationships be-
tween smoking, peer norms and exogenous determinants of smoking such as tobacco prices.
In particular, in these cases the price effect on smoking is understated (in fact insignificant).10
4See Frank and Strauss (1986); Wasserman and Pattison (1996)
5An evaluation of the likelihood requires the calculation of a summation with 2n
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terms, e.g. for n = 10,
2100 terms. In addition, MCMC algorithms offer a poor approximation (Bhamidi et al., 2011).
6See Liang (2010) and Murray et al. (2006). Mele (2017) studies asymptotic approximations of this sampler
and, in his numerical experiments, points to numerical benefits of occasionally using large update steps. The
analysis of k-PD here offers a rigorous basis for this observation with a model based on economic behavior.
7In a local Markov chain each update is of size o(n). For more see Bhamidi et al. (2011).
8Details about the Add Health data, including the sample construction, are in the appendix.
9This observation is consistent with the fact that individuals with higher degrees participate in fewer
clusters. I thank Mat Jackson for pointing to me this intuition.
10Standard arguments signing the omitted variable bias cannot be invoked because the correlation between
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I use the estimated model to perform a number of counterfactual experiments. First, I
ask whether the friendship network responds to changes in tobacco prices, e.g. an individual
may stop smoking and sever friendships with smokers, and whether this response has policy
relevant (quantitative) implications. When comparing how individuals respond in fixed versus
endogenous friendship network environments there are two effects to consider. The direct
effect of changing tobacco prices is the first order response and, intuitively, will be larger
whenever individuals are free to change their friendships, i.e. more individuals are likely to
immediately respond to changes in tobacco prices provided they are not confined to their
(smoking) friends. The indirect (ripple) effect of changing tobacco prices is the effect on
smoking which is due, in part, to the fact that one’s friends have stopped smoking. Contrary
to before, a fixed network propels the indirect effect, e.g. an individual who changes her
smoking status is bound to exert pressure to her friends (most likely smokers) and, thus,
likely to alter her friends’ decisions to smoke. It is, then, an empirical question how these two
opposing effects balance out. Simulations with the estimated model suggest that following
an increase in tobacco prices, the direct effect dominates, i.e. the response of the friendship
network amplifies the intended policy effects in the neighborhood of 10%.
Next, I analyze how changes in the racial composition of schools affect adolescent smoking.
When students from different racial backgrounds study in the same school, they interact and
are likely to become friends. Being from different racial backgrounds student have different
intrinsic propensity to smoke and the question is what is the equilibrium behavior in these
mixed-race friendships–those who do not smoke start smoking or those who smoke stop
smoking. Simulations from the model suggest that redistributing students from racially
segregated schools into racially balanced schools decreases the overall smoking prevalence by
slightly above 10%.
Finally, for a school from the sample with a particularly high smoking prevalence (45%),
I examine the possibility of an intervention targeting only part of this school’s population
which is capable of changing their smoking decisions11. The (empirical) question of interest
is when treated individuals return in the schools, will their friends follow their example,
i.e. extending the effect of the proposed policy beyond the set of treated individuals and
thus creating a domino effect, or will their, previous to the treatment, friends un-friend
them? In essence this is a question about the magnitude of the spillover effects and this
paper contribution is to account for the possibility of the friendship network to adjust to the
proposed treatment. Indeed, simulations with the model reveal that this spillover effect could
be in the neighborhood of 5 folds.12
the (omitted) peer norm and price is of ambiguous sign.
11The policy may consists of providing direct incentives or information about the health risks associated
with smoking tobacco. Then, it may be too expensive to treat the entire school and, instead, the policy maker
may engage only a small part of the school with the purpose to alter the social norms.
12Note that in the absence of social interactions, this effect will be absent as well.
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Related literature
The work of Nakajima (2007) and Mele (2017) have provided direct inspiration for this re-
search. Nakajima (2007) empirically studies peer effects abstracting from the friendship for-
mation and Mele (2017) obtains large network asymptotics of the model when restricted to the
link formation only. A handful of theoretical papers consider (broadly related) adaptive link
dynamics or model both network formation along with other choices potentially affected by
the network (See Jackson and Watts, 2002; Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2005; Cabrales et al.,
2011; Hiller, 2012; Ko¨enig et al., 2012; Baetz, 2015). The theoretical frameworks available,
however, are meant to provide focused insights into isolated features of networks and deliver
sharp predictions, but are not easily adapted for the purposes of estimation. In addition, a
typical approach is to focus the analysis on a particular equilibrium as opposed to discussing
all equilibria. Multiplicity of equilibria reflects the possibility of network and behavioral
externalities which is an indispensable feature of our settings.
Contemporary papers to propose econometric treatment of models of networks and ac-
tions are those of Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2014). The
focus of their work, however, is not policy analysis, which permits them to avoid the equilib-
rium microfoundations of a strategic model and an explicit treatment of the possibility for
multiplicity.13 Related work by Hsieh et al. (2016) propose a two-stage estimation procedure,
with an application to R and D, which relies on conditional independence of links delivered
by abstracting from link externalities. Auerbach (2016) obtains identification results within
large network asymptotics which also rely on conditional independence of links.14 Finally,
there are recent contributions to the econometrics literature which focus on link formation,
though are not easily extendable to include action choice as well.15
The empirical analysis of friendship networks and smoking behaviors lends support to a
host of results which are related to the large body of empirical work on social interactions
and teen risky behaviors. Of this literature, the closest to this work is Nakajima (2007).
In terms of estimates, this paper makes the first step in explaining of how unavailability
of data on the social network and not accounting for the response of these social network
could contribute the generally low estimates for the price elasticity of smoking.16 In addition,
existing empirical studies are confined to analysis with no data on friendship network or take
the friendship network as given and focus on the identification of peer effects. In this sense,
13Multiplicity in our settings makes the model intractable and, more importantly, deteriorates the statistical
power of model’s predictions.
14While the assumptions leading to conditional independence present conveniences at the implementation
stage, these limit the scope for studying peer effects, in addition ruling out nuanced motives such as friendship
rivalries or non-linear returns to friendships. As argued above and demonstrated by the empirical analysis,
these are of critical for studying the price effects on smoking.
15See Sheng (2014), Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2016), Leung (2014), de Paula et al. (2016), Graham
(2016), Menzel (2015) and the reviews in Chandrasekhar (2015); de Paula (2016); Bramoulle´ et al. (2016).
16See Chaloupka and Wechsler (1997) and (CDC, 2000, Surgeon General’s Report).
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the premise of this research is that friends cannot be assigned so that one cannot ask by how
much an additional friend who is a smoker increases one’s propensity to smoke.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical analysis
and obtains properties which are critical for the empirical implementation. Section 3 presents
the data and estimation of the model, and section 4 discusses the implications from the
countercfactual experiments. All formal proofs are in the appendix.
2 A Model of Friendships and Behaviours
The model is developed in two stages. First, agents’ strategic behavior is analyzed in static
settings and then a family of myopic dynamic processes is used to approximate the predictions
of the static model in a inferentially suitable way. I start with a simple model prototype which,
later on in our empirical application, is adapted to a more elaborate specification.
2.1 Players and preferences
A finite population N = {1, 2, ..., n} of agents decide on a binary action ai ∈ {0, 1} and
(asymmetric) relationships between each other gij ∈ {0, 1} for i, j ∈ N.
17 In our empirical
application, N is the collection of all student cohorts in a given high school at a given time
period, where ai = 1 if student i smokes and gij = 1 if i nominates j as a friend.
18 Agent
i selects her link nominations and action status S(i) = (ai, {gij}j 6=i) from her choice set
S(i) to maximize her payoff, which depends both on her exogenous characteristics Xi, e.g.
age, gender, etc, and on her endogenous characteristics, e.g. network position, decision of
her network neighbors, and etc. These endogenous characteristics capture externalities, in
various contexts referred to as peer effects or spillovers, and are of direct interest to our study.
The payoff of individual i, ui : S×X −→ R, orders the outcomes in S given the attributes
of the population X = (X1, ...,Xn) ∈ X in the following way:
ui(S,X) = aiv(Xi) + aih
∑
j
aj + aiφ
∑
j
gijgjiaj (1)
+
∑
j
gijw(Xi,Xj) +m
∑
j
gijgji + q
∑
j,k
gijgjkgki
Here v(.) and w(., .) are functions of agents’ (exogenous) characteristics. The incentives
17Our analysis trivially extends to continuous actions.
18Alternatively, the population of a geographically isolated area. Any closed collection of individuals who
draw friends from within themselves will fit the assumptions of the model. Alternatively, this assumption (if
the data do not span the complete network, for example) can be relaxed if one conditions on the existing
friendships with outsiders of the pool. Peers who are not in the data are not part of the model, in the sense
that the links to them can be thought of as part of the fixed attributes Xi. Then the model will explain the
formation of new friendships conditioning on the ones with outsiders.
7
encoded in (1) are easier to understand, if we consider the incremental payoffs from changing
just one dimension i’s decision, i.e., the incremental payoff of changing i’s action status or a
single link gij .
Consider ∆aiui(S,X) = ui(ai = 1, S−i,X)− ui(ai = 0, S−i,X) given as:
∆aiui(S,X) = v(Xi) +
∑
j 6=i
ajh
︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggr. externalities
+ φ
∑
j 6=i
gijgjiaj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
local externalities
(2)
Note that ∆aiui(S,X) depends on i’s observables, her friendship links, and the choices of
the overall population. The first term captures the possibility that the intrinsic preferences
over different action statuses may depend on an agent’s attributes - v(Xi), e.g., students
in higher grades smoke more. The next two (summation) terms capture externalities. The
local externalities terms ajgijgjiφ capture possible conformity pressures.
19 In the case of
friendships, one may be influenced strongly by the behavior of own friends as opposed to
casual individuals. On the other hand, h in the second summation captures the aggregate
externalities. A person may be potentially influenced from observing the behavior of the
surrounding population, irrespectively of whether these are friends or not. In principle, h
could be a function on individual’s exogenous attributes capturing, for example, a situation
where males are more likely to be affected by the observed behavior of other males as opposed
to the observed behavior of females.
Note how in formulation (2) there are two type of relationships: asymmetric, when there
is a single link between two agents, and symmetric (reciprocal). In addition, for reasons that
will become clear shortly, the model postulates that the externalities operate only through
reciprocal relations. It is important to realize that these assumptions may (and should)
be explicitly reasoned for given the context and the questions of a particular application.
For example, in our data only around 35% of the links are reciprocal. More interestingly,
direct inspection (via correlation coefficients and OLS regression) of the dependence between
individuals’ behaviors and that of their non-reciprocal and reciprocal friends reveals that only
the latter mediate statistically significant dependences. Given these observations, the model
seems particularly suitable to study peer effects in teenage friendship networks.
Turning to the incremental payoff from a new link ∆gijui(S,X) given as ui(gij = 1, S−ij ,X)−
19This is an example of positive externality. Alternative the local externality term may capture competitive
pressures, in which case the term may have negative sign.
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ui(gij = 0, S−ij ,X), from (1):
20
∆gijui(S,X) = w(Xi,Xj) + gjim︸︷︷︸
reciprocity
+ aiajgjiφij︸ ︷︷ ︸
choice segregation
+ q
∑
k
gikgkj︸ ︷︷ ︸
clustering/rivalry
(3)
The first term w(Xi,Xj) captures the baseline benefit from i’s unilateral decision to establish
a link to j, which may or may not depend on their degree of similarity, i.e., same sex, gender,
race, etc. The term gjim (Xi,Xj) shapes the degree of reciprocity.
21 The third term deserves
special attention. It reflects the degree of similarity in the choices of i and j, which is allowed
to create addition stimuli for i to establish a relationship with j. The last term captures the
possibility of a link externalities. Mechanically, if j links to k and k links to i then i may be
more likely link to j (thus closing the triangle). On the contrary, if there is friendship rivalry
this logic will have the opposite effect, i.e. q will be negative.
2.2 k-player Nash stable network states and Nash partitions
If agents make choices in their best interest, which patterns of links and behaviors are likely
to prevail? Given agent’s incentives, her observed links and behaviors are likely to compare
favorably against possible alternatives, i.e. are likely to be robust against a set of feasible
deviations. General considerations related to the complexity of individuals’ decision problem
could lend support to restricting the set of permissible deviations to local ones.22 Reasoning
about the “diameter” of these local deviations, however, has not fallen in the focus of extant
research and motivates a class of (non-cooperative) equilibria indexed by the diameter of the
permissible local deviations. For 1 < k ≤ n, k-player Nash stability fills in the gap between
the local stability argument of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and the Nash play discussed by
Bala and Goyal (2000).
A network state is k-player Nash stable, for 1 < k ≤ n, if any set of k agents play a
Nash equilibrium of the induced game between the k of them, conditioning on the rest of the
network. In the induced game each participant chooses actions and friendship links (only to
the participants) simultaneously. This formalizes the intuition that whenever individuals de-
cide whether a “profitable” deviation is available, they do not consider all possible friendship
combinations (which even for a population of size 100 is 299). Instead, individuals consider
20Again, the decisions do not need to be sequential. Rather I am presenting the incremental payoffs of a
friendship so the associations between functional forms and the object of interest are apparent.
21The reciprocity varies substantially between applications. In our data from high school friendships for
example the degree of reciprocity is below 40 percent. In financial network data, it may be as low as 10
percent.
22Indeed, the seminal paper of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) proposes a notion of stability where the presence
of a link implies that none of the parties involved has unilateral incentive to sever this link in isolation. The
parties do not consider deviations involving severing multiple links at the same time.
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Figure 1: Example 2- and 3- player Nash stability
1
2
5
3
4
(a.) Γ|{3,4}
1
2
5
3
4
(b.) Γ|{2,3}
1
2
5
3
4
(c.) Γ|{2,3,4}
altering only part of their friendships at a time.
Let Γ be the n-player normal form game {S(i), ui}i∈I where as before S(i) is the choice
set (strategy space) of agent i.
Definition 1 Let S ∈ S and Ik = {i1, i2, ..., ik} ⊆ I, for 1 < k ≤ n. Define the restriction
of Γ to Ik at S as the k-player normal form game Γ|Ik , in the following way: (i) The set
of players is {i1, i2, ..., ik}; (ii) The strategy space is S(i|Ik) = {0, 1}
k, for i ∈ Ik, with typical
element S(i|Ik) = (ai, {gij}j∈Ik,j 6=i); (iii) The payoffs are given by the restriction ui|S(Ik)
of ui
in (1) on S(Ik) = ×i∈IkS(i|Ik).
Definition 2 For 1 < k ≤ n, the network state S ∈ S is said to be k-player Nash stable
provided that for any set of k players Ik ⊆ I, the restriction of S on Ik
S|Ik = ({ai}i∈Ik , {gij}i,j∈Ik) ⊆ S
is a Nash equilibrium of Γ|Ik at S.
Figure 1 illustrates the notion of k-player Nash stability in a network with n = 5 individ-
uals. The left two diagrams show a network state which is 2-player Nash stable. In such a
state for every pair, the individuals within the pair are forming relationships with each other
optimally (i.e., each individual plays best response to the strategy of the other). For example
Diagram (a.) considers the pair consisting of individuals 3 and 4. In the game between them
Γ|{3,4}, whenever individual 3 chooses (a3, g34) and individual 4 chooses (a4, g43), the shaded
outcome constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Similarly the shaded region in Diagram (b.) depicts
a Nash equilibrium of Γ|{2,3}. Now suppose that although individual 3 best response in Γ|{2,3}
and Γ|{3,4} is consistent with the depicted state, his best response in Γ|{2,3,4} would be to
sever his friendship with 4, nominate 2 as a friend, and choose a3 = 0. Diagram (c.) depicts
such a deviation which is not permissible in the context of 2-player Nash stability.
Denote the set of all k-player Nash stable states with S∗k−NS. Intuitively, as k increases,
k-player Nash stability places stronger requirements on what outcomes players consider as
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optimal (in the sense of being a best repose to the play of the rest). Indeed, the larger
k is the larger is the consideration set over which a player determines her best response.
Consequently, one would expect S∗k−NS to shrink as k increases. Below we formalize this
intuition and provide an equivalent description of k-PS.
Definition 3 Consider a partition ιm = {I1, I2, ..., Im} of the set of players I i.e. I = ∪Ij
and Ij ∩ Ik = ∅ for j 6= k. For the normal form game Γ, define a state S ∈ S to be partition
Nash stable with respect to partition ιm provided S|Ik is a Nash equilibrium of Γ|Ik for
all Ik ∈ ιm.
Lemma 1 Let Γ be the n-player normal form game {S(i), ui}. Then the following holds:
(i) A state S ∈ S is k-player Nash stable if and only if S is partition Nash stable with
respect to all partitions ιm = {I1, I2, ..., Im} such that |Ir| ≤ k,∀1 ≤ r ≤ m.
(ii) The family of k-player Nash stable states is ordered as S∗2−NS ⊇ . . . S
∗
k−NS ⊇ . . . S
∗
n−NS .
In terms of equilibrium existence (and simple adaptive dynamic), our model falls in the
category of potential games.23
Proposition 1 [Existence] For any 1 < k ≤ n, there exists at least one k-payer Nash
stable state. Moreover the set of all k-player Nash stable states is characterized by:
S∗k−NS =
{
S ∈ S : S(i|Ir) ∈ arg max
S˜(i|Ir)
P(S˜(i|Ir), S−(i|Ir),X) ∀Ir ⊆ I, |Ir| ≤ k
}
(4)
where P : S×Xn −→ R is a potential for the game in normal form.
2.3 Adaptive behavior and a random utility framework
In his doctoral thesis Nash (1950) suggested that equilibrium might arise from some “mass
action” as opposed to from a complex reasoning process.
We shall now take up the “mass-action” interpretation of equilibrium points.
In this interpretation solutions have no great significance. It is unnecessary to
assume that the participants have full knowledge of the total structure of the
game, or the ability and inclination to go through any complex reasoning process.
But the participants are supposed to accumulate empirical information on the
relative advantages of the various pure strategies at their disposal.
23Congestion games were the first class of games exhibiting this property (Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten,
1956; Rosenthal, 1973). Monderer and Shapley (1996) recognize that congestion games are instances of games
with potential, propose several notions of potential functions for games in strategic form, and obtain a char-
acterization of potential games.
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Indeed k-NS, including the Nash equilibrium, dispense with any behavioral model of
network formation. While there is some argument for the state to persist once it is reached,
it is not clear what behavioral mechanism will drive the system to such a state. Below
I consider a family of myopic dynamic processes, which abstracts from any coordination
between players and for which these stable states are both attractors and absorbing states.
2.3.1 k-player dynamic (k-PD)
The k-player dynamics (k-PD) is a family of myopic dynamic processes which not only can
give rise to an equilibrium as opposed to a complex reasoning process but also delivers a
probabilistic ranking of k-PS. Consider a time dimension of the play, where individuals make
their choices sequentially and revise these choices frequently.24 In each period, which need
not be of equal length, one agent adapts her strategy with respect to the current state of the
network.25 More specifically, a randomly chosen individual (say i) meets a random set Ik−1
of k − 1 individuals from the population I. All individuals in Ik−1 are potential friends and
upon meeting them i decides jointly whether to befriend any (or all) of them and whether or
not to change her action status ai. The rules of the play in period t are determined by the
outcome of a (stochastic) meeting process µt, which outputs who makes choices and who are
the individuals considered as potential friends. Formally:
Pr (µt = (i, Ik) |St−1,X) = µi,Ik (St−1,X) (5)
It is clear that the sequence of meetings and players’ optimal decisions induce a sequence of
network states (St), which is indexed by time subscript t.
26
Note that each k-PS is a rest point of a meeting process of dimension k—loosely speeking,
if the network reaches such a state, it will stay there forever. In addition, minimal assumptions
guarantee that k-PS are attractors of the proposed dynamic.
24For similar dynamic with k = 2 see Cournot (1838); Nash (1950); Blume (1993); Jackson and Watts
(2002).
25Note that, in rationalizing the individual’s responses, such models put all the weight on the contempora-
neous environment rather than on the human ability to forecast the actions of the other. This is an adequate
visualization of the reality under at least two scenarios. First, if the action of a single individual cannot
substantially affect the future development of the network. In such cases individuals do not need to behave
strategically with respect to the future response of the network. Second, if individuals form stationary expec-
tations about the future that are, in fact, consistent with the current network state. In this case, although
individuals need to act strategically with respect to the future, their best response to the current state is
indeed a best response to the expected network state tomorrow as well. Thus, the proposed approach is likely
to be plausible in studying decisions such as smoking and drinking, while it seems inappropriate in situations
where an individual’s forecast about the future is likely to be important (for example, to study fertility or
career choices).
26In the simplest case, any meeting is equally probable so that: µi,Ik (St−1, X) =
1
n
1
(n−1
k
)
. Also more general
meeting technologies are possible, e.g. with bias for people with similar actions and/or characteristics, as, for
example, µi,Ik (St−1, X) ∝ exp {−maxj∈Ik{d(ai, aj)} −maxj∈Ik{d(Xi, Xj)}} with d being a generic distance
function.
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Assumption 1 Any meeting is possible Pr (µt = (i, Ik−1)|S,X) > 0 for all i ∈ I, Ik 6= ∅,
S ∈ S and X ∈ X.
Proposition 2 Let 1 < k ≤ n and suppose that assumption 1 holds then
1. Any S ∈ S∗k−NS is absorbing i.e. if St ∈ S
∗
k−NS then St′ = St for all t
′ > t.
2. Independently of the initial condition (distribution) Pr
(
limt→∞ St ∈ S
∗
k−NS
)
= 1.
The first part of proposition 2 is implied immediately from the definition of S∗k−NS. In
this setting, the second part follows elegantly from the observation that the potential function
{Pt} is a sub-martingale.
While the dynamic perspective introduced above addresses the concern raised by Kandori, Mailath and Rob
(1993), namely, it explains how equilibrium is reached from the behavior of the agents, it
exhibits some undesirable properties. First and foremost, it does not provide a convenient
statistical framework that can be estimated given network data. In the model, the uncer-
tainty is driven solely by the meeting process, which is likely to be unobservable. Thus, which
equilibrium will be played is entirely determined by the realization of µ. Moreover, it is not
a priori clear which mode of the meeting process is observed in the data, i.e., what is k, and
different k will result in observing different classes of equilibria.
2.3.2 A random utility framework
The assumption below introduces to this discrete choice problem a random preference shock
very much in the spirit of a random utility model.27 Similar stochastic has been considered
by the literature on stochastic stability, which when shocks vanish over time, presents an
equilibrium selection device.28
Assumption 2 Suppose that the utilities in (1) contain a random preference shock. More
specifically, let
ui(S,X) = ui(S,X) + ǫi,S
with ǫi,S ∼ i.i.d. across time, individuals and network states. Moreover, suppose that ǫ has
c.d.f. and unbounded support on R.
Assumption 3 Suppose that the preference shock ǫ is distributed Gumbel(µ, β).
Assumption 4 Suppose that for the meeting probability µ: (i) Pr(µt = (i, Ik)) does not
depend on the relationship status between i and any j ∈ Ik. (ii) Pr(µt = (i, Ik)) does not
depend on ai. These together imply µi,Ik(S,X) = µi,Ik(S
′,X) for all S = (S(i|Ik), S−(i|Ik))
and S′ = (S′(i|Ik), S−(i|Ik)).
27See Thurstone (1927); Marschak (1960); McFadden (1974).
28See Foster and Young (1990); Kandori et al. (1993).
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The matching process {µt}
∞
t=1 and the sequence of optimal choices, in terms of friends
selection and individual actions, induce a Markov chain of network configurations on S.29
The above assumption guarantees that this chain obeys some desirable properties, which
are formalized below. First, I lay out a formal statement of a theorem and then discuss its
implications. (The proof is in the appendix on p. 30.)
Theorem 1 [Stationary distribution] Let 1 < k ≤ n and suppose assumptions 1 and 2
hold. The Markov chain generated by the k-PD has the following properties:
1. There exists a unique stationary distribution πk ∈ ∆(S) for which limt→∞ Pr(St = S) =
πk(S). In addition, for any function f : S→ R,
1
T
∑T
t=0 f(St) −→
∫
f (S) dπk.
2. Under assumptions 1-4:
πk(S,X) ∝ exp
(
P(S,X)
β
)
(6)
In particular, πk(S,X) does not depend on k.
The first part is not surprising in that it asserts that the Markov chain, generated by
the k-player meeting process, is well behaved so that standard convergence results apply.
The uniqueness of πk precludes any ambiguity in the predictions of the process, while the
ergodicity is relevant whenever we want to draw predictions from the model. However, the
second part of the theorem has novel implications.
Note how in (1) the stationary distribution does not depend on k and, thus, delivers an
approach to unify the family of k-PS. As we formally argue in theorem 3, the stationary
distribution offers a probabilistic ranking of the set k-player stable states (within and across
different ks). In addition, the closed-form expression for the stationary distribution has
advantages for the empirical implementation of the proposed framework, where πk can be
treated as the likelihood. In particular, one can explore a transparent argument for the
identification of model’s parameters. It is clear that, given the variation in the data of
individual choices {ai}
n
i=1, friendships {gij}
n
i,j=1 and attributes {Xi}
n
i=1, functional forms for
v,w,m, h, q will be identified as long as the different parameters induce different likelihoods
of the data. Also, a closed-form expression for πk facilitates the use of likelihood-based
estimation methods, including Bayesian ones.30
The second main question in this section is how to differentiate the family of k-player
dynamic with respect to how well, for a given k, observations from this dynamic is represented
by the stationary distribution πk. We obtain a sharp characterization with respect to the
29See the stochastic-choice dynamics in Blume (1993).
30To provide intuition behind this result consider two states S, S′ ∈ S. It can be shown that the probability
of moving from S to S′ is proportional to the probability of returning from S′ to S by a factor that does not
depend on k. The formal argument can be found in the appendix.
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second eigen value of the transient operator of the k-PD.31 The assertion is formulated in the
most stark case when the only factor influencing the speed of convergence is the dimension
of the meeting process.32
Theorem 2 [k-PD ranking] Suppose that P(S) = c for all S ∈ Sn. For 2 ≤ k < k
′ ≤ n,
the k′-PD converges strictly faster than k-PD to the stationary equilibrium π. In particular,
the second eigen value of k-PD is given by
λk,[2] =
1
n
(
n− 1 +
n− k
n− 1
)
(7)
There are two rationales behind the pursuit of a characterization of the speed of conver-
gence of k-PD. As anticipated (and formally established shortly) πk probabilistically ranks
the family of k-PS and (of course) Nash equilibria are clear favorites. In a dual fashion, the
differential speed of convergence provides a means to rank probabilistically the k-PD in the
sense of how likely are these to be represented by the stationary distribution. Theorem 2
suggests that for large ks, for which the unperturbed k-PD is more likely to converge to a
Nash equilibrium, k-PD converges the fastest.
The second reason for why studying how well the k-PD is represented by the stationary
distribution πk was highlighted first by Bhamidi et al. (2011) who showed that “mass action”
dynamics with local updates converges very slowly.33 Note that k-PD encompasses not
only local updates, e.g. k = [n/2], and thus offers a way to address the problem of slow
convergence (poor approximation).34 In addition, theorem 2 offers insights into an important
trade-off motivated by the practical implementation of the framework. In designing sampling
schemes the Markov chain is facing a trade-off between speed of convergence and complexity
in simulating the next step. Whenever k is small, the speed of convergence to the stationary
distribution is slower, however, the computational difficulty in updating the network at each
step is smaller. The opposite holds when k is large.
2.4 Discussion
The family of stochastic best response dynamics (indexed by dimension k) has a particular
meaning in our settings. Their (common) stationary distribution delivers a device to proba-
31In our case the speed of convergence is shaped by how powers of the transient matrix map any initial
state to the eigenvector with eigenvalue one. All eigen values except one are strictly less than 1 so that the
limiting behavior of this exponentiation is governed by the second eigenvalue.
32In general, the shape of the potential and the geography of the network will likely influence the speed of
convergence. For more see Bhamidi et al. (2011). As far as I know treatment of the most general case remains
out of reach.
33A Markov chain is local if at most o(n) links are updated at a time.
34This question is relevant not only the positive analysis of the k-PD but, from a purely practical view
point, also for the implementation of various estimation/simulation techniques when working with the model
(Chandrasekhar and Jackson, 2016).
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bilistically rank these equilibria. Below we return to this point, present a generalize meeting
process (random-k-k-player), and briefly comment on the link with the notions of a quantal
response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) and a correlated equilibrium (Aumann,
1974).
2.4.1 Probabilistic ranking and long-run equilibria
The stationary distribution obtained in theorem 1 gives an intuitive (probabilistic) ranking
of the family of k-player Nash stable equilibria. Under π, all k-Nash stable states receive a
positive probability (across all possible values of k). Moreover, and realistically, a network
state will receive a positive probability, although it may not be an equilibrium in any sense.
It will be desirable, however, that in the vicinity of an equilibrium, the equilibrium to receive
the highest probability. Relatedly, the mode of π (i.e. the state with the highest probability)
has special role. The goal in this section is to provide a new perspective to the theoretical
results on equilibrium selection from evolutionary game theory, namely equilibrium ranking.
To formalize our discussion, define the neighborhood N ⊂ S of S ∈ S as:
N =
{
S′ : S′ = (gij , S−ij), i 6= j
}⋃{
S′ : S′ = (ai, S−i)
}
Next, define a state S as a long-run equilibrium of the network formation model if for any
sequence of vanishing preference shocks, the stationary distribution π places a positive prob-
ability on S (Kandori et al., 1993).
Theorem 3 Suppose assumptions 1-4 hold:
1. A state S ∈ S is a 2-player Nash stable if and only if it receives the highest probability
in its neighborhood N.
2. The most likely network states Smode ∈ S (the one where the network spends most of
its time) are Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game i.e. Smode ∈ S∗n−NS.
3. The long-run equilibria of the underlying evolutionary model that are given by Smode,
which need not be Pareto efficient.
2.4.2 Meeting process of random dimension
Now consider what appears to be a very unrestrictive meeting process, where every period
a random individual meets a set of potential friends of random size and composition. Let
κ be a discrete process with support 2, . . . , n and augment the meeting process with an
additional initialization step with respect to the dimension of µ. In particular, at each period
first κ is realized and then µk is drawn just as before. It is relatively straightforward to
establish, without any assumptions on the process κ, that this augmented process has the
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same stationary distribution π as the one from theorem 1.35 This is another demonstration
of the fact that different meeting processes result in observationally equivalent models.
2.4.3 Quantal response equilibrium
The notion of a quantal response equilibrium (QRE), introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995), is a fixed point of the quantal-response functions (QRFs), very much like Nash equi-
librium is a fixed point of the best response functions. The QRF of player i is a smoothed
best response function, where the strictly rational choice of player i (i.e., the best response)
is replaced by an approximately rational response. A (regular) quantal-response function
satisfies the following axioms:
(i) Interiority: every strategy in i’s strategy space receives a strictly positive probability.
(ii) Continuity: the probability of player i choosing pure strategy s is a continuously
differentiable function of i’s expected payoff from choosing s.
(iii) Responsiveness: the first derivative of the above probability is strictly positive for all
players on the support of the expected payoffs.
(iv) Monotonicity: strategies with higher expected payoff receive a higher probability.
The existence of a (regular) quantile response equilibrium of a finite-player finite-strategy
space normal form game trivially follows from Brower’s fixed point theorem. Any such
equilibrium induces a probability distribution πQRE over S = S1 × S2 × ... × Sn where Si
is the set of pure strategies of player i. Note that πQRE is the Cartesian product of the
equilibrium quantile responses and whence inherits their properties - i.e., the conditional
distributions satisfy the axioms above. By way of comparison, the stationary distribution π
of the network formation model bears some similarities to the axioms of QRF inherited in
πQRE . However, there are important differences. I discuss each in turn.
Proposition 3 The conditional distribution of player i’s choices (i.e., ai, {gij}j 6=i) on the
choices of the rest of the players – π(i)|(−i) ∈ ∆({0, 1}
n) – induced by the optimal play in the
network formation model satisfies all properties of a (regular) quantile response function -
interiority, continuity, responsiveness, and monotonicity. However, a QRE cannot induce π.
The first part follows trivially from the expression for π, given by theorem 1. Since the
discrete network formation game is a game with potential, all payoffs can be represented by
a single function of the network state - the potential P. Importantly, the potential ranks the
network states consistently with individual preferences and, at the same time, is linked to the
probability of observing a given state. Thus, it is not surprising that π exhibits the intuitive
properties of πQRE .
35I omit here the formal statement and the proof as it essentially follows the one from 1.
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For the second part, note that the sequential decision process induces a correlation be-
tween players’ decisions. In particular, the distribution π in theorem 1 cannot necessarily be
factored as a product of marginal probability distributions over each player choice set S(i).
(for a formal example see page 32) It then follows that QRE cannot induce π. For the same
reason, π cannot be induced by a mixed strategy profile of the unperturbed n player one-shot
network formation game. In essence, the outcome of the sequential network play is bears
similarities to the notion of a correlated equilibrium in Aumann (1974).
3 Data and estimation
I implement the model with data on smoking and friendships from the National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) data. The estimation is non-standard in that the
likelihood can be evaluated only up to an intractable constant. Fortunately, both frequentist
and Bayesian methods relying on MCMC algorithms have been adapted to deal with these
complications.36 In addition, this particular implementation benefits the intuition of theo-
rems 1 and 2, which have direct implications for constructing algorithms for estimation and
simulation from the model.
3.1 The Add Health data
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health is a longitudinal study of a nationally
representative sample of adolescents in grades 7–12 in the United States in the 1994–95 school
year. In total, 80 high schools were selected together with their “feeder“ schools. The sample
is representative of US schools with respect to region of country, urbanicity, school size,
school type, and ethnicity. The students were first surveyed in-school and then at home in
four follow-up waves conducted in 1994–95, 1996, 2001–02, and 2007–08. This paper makes
use of Wave I of the in-home interviews, which contain rich data on individual behaviors,
home environment, and friendship networks.37
To provide unbiased and complete coverage of the social network, all enrolled students in
the schools from the so-called saturated sample were eligible for in-home interviews. These
were 16 schools of which 2 large schools (with a total combined enrollment exceeding 3,300)
and 14 small schools (with enrollments of fewer than 300). One of the large schools is
predominantly white and is located in a mid-sized town. The other is ethnically heterogeneous
36See Geyer and Thompson (1992); Murray et al. (2006); Mele (2017).
37In addition to the in-home interview from Wave I, data on friendship are available from the in-school and
Wave III interviews. However, the in-school questionnaire itself does not provide information on important
dimensions of an individual’s socio-economic and home environment, such as student allowances, parental
education, and parental smoking behaviors. On the other hand, during the collection of the Wave III data,
the respondents were not in high school any more. For more details on Add Health research design, see
www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design.
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and is located in a major metropolitan area. The 14 small schools, some public and some
private, are located in both rural and urban areas.
In addition, Add Health data have been merged with existing databases with information
about respondents’ neighborhoods and communities. For example, the American Chamber
of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) compiles cost of living index, which is linked
to the Add Health data on the basis of state and county FIPS codes for the year in which
the data were collected. From the ACCRA, I use administrative data on the average price
of a carton of cigarettes.38 Additional details about the estimation sample including sample
construction and sample statistics are presented in the appendix.
3.2 Bayesian estimation
Given the k-player meeting process, theorem 1 demonstrates that the network state evolves
according to a Markov chain with a unique stationary distribution π on the set of all network
states S. Because no information is available on when the network process started or on its
initial state, the best prediction about the network state is given by π. Thus, for estimation
purposes, the stationary distribution can be thought of as the likelihood. Given a single
network observation S ∈ S, the likelihood is given by:
p(S|θ) =
exp{Pθ(S)}
Hθ
(8)
where Pθ is the potential (evaluated at θ) and Hθ =
∑
S∈S exp{S} is an (intractable) nor-
malizing constant. The intractability of Hθ encapsulates the fact that the size of S and the
summation in calculating Hθ are so large, even for small networks, that the value of p(S|θ)
cannot be calculated directly for practical purposes.39
The specific form of the likelihood pertains to the exponential family, whose application
to graphical models has been termed as Exponential Random Graph Models.40 Various gen-
erative and descriptive approaches have been proposed, both within frequentist and Bayesian
paradigms, to address this specific tractability problem we outlined above. This paper adopts
a Bayesian approach and our algorithm for sampling from the posterior is an adaptation of
the double M-H algorithm of Murray et al., 2006 and Mele (2017), informed by theorem 2.
The posterior sampling algorithm is exhibited in table 1. In the original double M-H
algorithm, an M-H sampling of S from πθ(S) is nested in an M-H sampling of θ from the
posterior p(θ§). The novelty of my approach is the random dimension of the meeting process
in step 5. Theorem 2 suggests that varying k improves the convergence and theorem 1
38For details see the Council for Community and Economic Research www.c2er.org, formerly the American
Chamber of Commerce Research Association.
39For n = 10 the summation includes 2100 terms.
40For more see Frank and Strauss (1986); Wasserman and Pattison (1996); Mele (2017);
Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2016).
19
Table 1: Varying double M-H algorithm
Input: initial θ(0), number of iterations T , size of the Monte Carlo R, data S
1. for t = 1 . . . T
2. Propose θ′ ∼ q(θ′; θ(t−1), S)
3. Initialize S(0) = S
4. for r = 1 . . . R
5. Draw k ∼ pk(k)
6. Draw a meeting µ(i, Ik) where i ∈ {1 . . . N} and Ik ⊂ {1 . . . N}\{i} from qµ(i, Ik)
8. Propose S′ where (ai, {gij}j∈Ik) are drawn from qµ(S
′|S(r−1); (i, Ik))
9. Compute a¯ =
exp{Pθ′ (S
′)}
exp{Pθ′ (S
(r−1))}
Q(S(r−1)|S′;pk,qi,Ik )
Q(S′|S(r−1);pk,qi,Ik )
10. Draw a ∼ Uniform[0, 1]
11. If a < a¯ then S(r) = S′ else S(r) = S(r−1)
12. end for [r]
13. Compute a¯ = q(θ
′;θ(t−1))
q(θ(t−1);θ′)
p(θ′)
p(θ(t−1))
exp{P
θ(t−1)
(S(R))}
exp{P
θ(t−1)
(S)}
exp{Pθ′ (S)}
exp{Pθ′ (S
(R))}
14. Draw a ∼ Uniform[0, 1]
15. If a < a¯ then θ(t) = θ′ else θ(t) = θ(t−1)
16. end for [t]
demonstrates that changing k leaves the stationary distribution unaltered. The validity of
the particular implementation is proven in proposition 4.
Proposition 4 [Varying double M-H algorithm] Let 1 < k ≤ n and suppose assump-
tions 1 and 2 hold. If in the algorithm of table 1, the proposal density conditional on meeting
(i, Ik) of random dimension k, qµ(S
′|S); (i, Ik)) is symmetric, then the unconditional proposal
Q(S′|S) is symmetric. In particular, the acceptance ratio of the inner M-H step 9 does not
depend on pk and qµ.
Finally, the Bayesian estimator requires specifying prior distributions and proposal den-
sities. The prior p(θ) is normal centered around the OLS coefficients of the respective linear
regressions. The variances are chosen wide enough so that 0 is a standard deviation away
from the mean. Proposals pk, µ, and qµ are uniform over their respective domains.
3.3 Parametrization
I explore a wide set of parametrizations which are informed by the salient features of the
data and by the particular experiments I am interested in.41 Careful scrutiny of the patterns
41Importantly, the trade off between flexibility and data limitation is tight. Recall that our identification
framework is casted in the many networks asymptotics and, in the end, we have 12 networks.
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of smoking by socioeconomic factors together with the mixing patterns of smokers and non-
smokers motivates the following incremental payoffs given in (2)
∆aiui(S,X) = v(Xi) + h
∑
j 6=i
aj + φ
∑
j 6=i
ajgijgji + ǫa,i
with baseline utility of smoking v(Xi) = v0 + v1 ln(y) +
∑
. v.d.(Xi) where the indicator
functions d.(Xi) include: (i.) smoker in the household, (ii.) mother’s education (high school
or some college), and (iii.) dummy race (only for) blacks.
The incremental utility of adding a link given in (3) becomes:
∆gijui(S,X) = w(Xi,Xj) +mgji + φgjiaiaj
+2di + 1 +
∑
k
(gjk + gkj)(gki + gik)q + ǫg,ij
the first term w(Xi,Xj) contains dummies for: (i.) different sex, (ii.) different grade, (iii.)
different race, and di stands for the number of friends of i.
42
3.4 Identification
The identification, within the framework of many networks, follows trivially from the connec-
tion of the model with the family of exponential random graph models (ERGM). These are
a broad class of statistical models, capable of incorporating arbitrary dependencies among
the links of a network. As a result, ERGM have been very popular in estimating statistical
models of network formation (see Jackson, 2008). A powerful corollary of theorem 1 is that
the likelihood of the model falls in the family of ERGM. In more general terms, it follows
that ERGM are broad enough to incorporate the strategic incentives of the static one-shot
play embedded in π.
Corollary 1 The likelihood of the model can be written as l(θ|S) ∝ exp
{∑R
r=1 θiwi(S,X)
}
,
where wi : S×X −→ R.
As the number of networks grows to infinity, identification follows from the theory of the
exponential family. In particular, it is enough that the sufficient statistics wi are linearly
independent functions on S×X. In the structural parametrization of the model above, this
condition is established immediately.43
42So that the marginal payoff of friendships is decreasing provided d < 0.
43Most of the parameters are identified in the asymptotic frame, where the size of the network grows to
infinity (as opposed to the number of networks going to infinity). Further discussion of this point is outside
the scope of this work. For more see Xu (2011); Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2016).
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Unobservable heterogeneity in friendship selection and decision to smoke
In addition to the models’ parameters for observable attributes, it is possible to incorporate
agents’ specific unobservable types τi ∼ N(0, σ
2
τ ) which may influence both the utility for
friendships, e.g. W (., .) could include term |τi − τj|, and also the propensity to smoke, e.g.
V (.) could include a term ρττi. In this case the likelihood has to integrate out ~τ :
p(S|θ) =
∫
~τ
exp{Pθ(S,~τ}∑
Sˆ exp{Pθ(Sˆ, ~τ)}
φ(~τ)d~τ (9)
For this extension, in the many network asymptotics framework, the heuristic identifi-
cation argument goes as follows. Individuals who are far away in observables, must have
realizations of the unobservables very close by. If in the data those individuals are either
smokers or non smokers with very high probability then it must be the case that ρτ is large.
Adding unobservable heterogeneity imposes substantial computational costs to the esti-
mation and simulation algorithms because these need to include an additional step—drawing
from ~τ . For the Add Health data, such an extension is out of reach because of the limited
number of well-sampled networks.
3.5 Estimation results
Table 2 presents the posterior means and indicates whether the shortest 90%, 95%, and
99% credible sets of the posterior sample contain zero. To facilitate the interpretation of
the estimates table 2 reports the baseline and marginal probabilities directly. For example,
the parameter on the baseline utility of smoking θ1 in fact equals
ev0
1+ev0 .
44 The index MP
stands for marginal probability and MP% stands for marginal probability in percentages
(with respect to the baseline probability).
The estimates suggest a substantial role for friends and the home environment in adoles-
cents’ decisions to smoke. In particular, one additional friend who is a smoker increases the
conditional probability of smoking by 2.5 ppt.45 If 30% of the students in a school smoke, all
other things being equal, then an individual is 7.4 ppt more likely to smoke (row 7). Also the
presence of a smoker in the household increases the likelihood of smoking by 11.5 ppt. Note
that these marginal effects are first order approximations which do not take into account the
equilibrium effect after individuals adjust their social norms and friendships. The section with
counterfactual experiments presents an equilibrium empirical analysis of the determinants of
adolescents’ smoking decisions.
44So that v0 = ln(θ1)− ln(1− θ1).
45Because both friendships and smoking are choices in the model, this parameter should be interpreted with
caution. In particular, the estimate cannot be interpreted as the effect on the likelihood of smoking from
a randomly assigned friend who is a smoker. In such a case, the individual who is subject to this random
assignment may simply drop this friendship as opposed to start smoking.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Utility of smoking
Parameter No Net Data Fixed Net Model I Model II Model III
1 Baseline probability of smoking 0.198∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
2 Price −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003∗
3 HH smokesMP 0.091∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
4 Mom edu (HS&CO)MP −0.031∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
5 BlacksMP −0.169∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗
6 Grade 9+MP 0.128∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
7 30% of the school smokesMP 0.079∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
Utility of friendships
Parameter No SNet Data Fixed Net Model I Model II Model III
8 Baseline number of friends — — 3.182∗∗∗ 3.144∗∗∗ 2.559∗∗∗
9 Different sexMP% — — −0.345∗∗∗ −0.376∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗
10 Different gradesMP% — — −0.727∗∗∗ −0.735∗∗∗ −0.718∗∗∗
11 Different raceMP% — — −0.394∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.337∗∗∗
12 ReciprocityMP — — 0.387∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
13 Degree squaredMP — — — 0.009∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
14 TrianglesMP% — — 0.019 — −0.056∗∗∗
15 φMP — 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
Note: MP stands for the estimated marginal probability in percentage points and MP% for estimated
marginal probability in percent, relative to the baseline probability. The posterior sample contains
105 simulations before discarding the first 20%. Posterior mean outside of the shortest 90/95/99%
credible sets is indicated by ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ respectively.
Recall that the most central (and challenging) feature of peer influences (in endogenous
networks) is the possibilities of externalities and note how the presence of externalities in
friendship formation reveal (row 12 and 13) that there is rivalry (exclusivity) for friendship in
that the true coefficient on completing a triangle is negative. Furthermore, observe that this is
only possible to see once we make the incremental payoff of an extra friendship concave (term
degree squared). For if not, the rivalry for friendships motive gets absorbed in the returns
to scale motive and the posterior mean of the coefficient from the former is indistinguishable
from zero.
A less subtle manifestation of these externalities is the change in the estimate of the
price coefficient between the specifications where social network data is not available to the
researcher or is kept fixed (the first two columns) and the full model (column 4). In these
cases, the price effect on smoking is incorrectly understated (in fact insignificant). Note
that a standard argument signing the omitted variable bias cannot be immediately invoked
here. Moreover, in the data the correlation between the (omitted) peer norm and price is
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Table 3: Model fit
Moment Model Data
Prevalence 0.325 0.308
Density 0.017 0.017
Reciprocity 0.345 0.328
Avg degree 2.155 2.199
Max degree out 7.926 8.001
Max degree in 8.826 9.917
Max reciprocal degree 4.372 4.500
aigijgjiaj/n 0.064 0.080
(1− ai)gijgji(1− aj)/n 0.215 0.204
Triangles/n 0.281 0.358
Table 4: Fit mixing matrix (model left, data right)
Nominee Nominee
N
o
m
in
a
to
r Smoker Nonsmoker Smoker Nonsmoker
Smoker 46% (53.6) 54% (62.2) 58% (69.1) 42% (48.5)
Nonsmoker 30% (63) 70% (149.9) 29% (61.5) 71% (152.4)
of ambiguous sign.46 Overall, these findings point to the presence of intricate (non-linear)
relationships between smoking, peer norms and exogenous determinants of smoking such as
tobacco prices.
3.6 Model fit
Using the parameter estimates, a Markov chain of size 105 from the k-player dynamic is
simulated from which, to reduce the auto dependence, every 1, 000 element is sampled. Table
3 displays selected statistics from the data and from the simulated sample which by design
is representative for the stationary distribution. In addition to statistics that are directly
targeted by the model’s parameters (overall prevalence, density, and reciprocity), statistics
which are only indirectly governed by model parameters are reported in tables 3 and 4,
e.g. maximum degree, certain friendship configurations, mixing etc. Overall the model fits
well the smoking decisions and the network features of the data. The only caveat is the
proportion of smoking friends as a fraction of the overall friends of a smoker which in the
data are 58% while in the model are 46%. The most likely reason for this discrepancy is the
restriction of φ1 = φ2 in the terms φ1aigijgjiaj/n and φ2(1 − ai)gijgji(1 − aj)/n. While the
proposed approach can handle a more flexible case, the limited data availability precludes
the estimation of a more general specification allowing φ1 = φ2.
46In more than half of the schools this correlation is positive.
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Table 5: Changes in the price of tobacco
Price increase Full model Soc net off PE off Model w/o PE
15 2.7 2.5 0.7 2.8
30 5.1 4.5 1.3 5.4
45 7.0 6.5 2.0 7.6
60 8.9 8.3 2.6 10.0
75 10.4 9.7 3.1 12.0
90 11.7 11.4 4.0 13.9
105 13.1 12.5 4.4 15.8
120 14.1 13.5 5.0 17.6
135 15.1 14.6 5.7 19.4
150 16.2 15.6 6.0 20.1
Note: The first column shows proposed increases in tobacco prices in cents. The average price of a
pack of cigarettes is $1.67 so that 15 cents is approximately 10%. The second through fourth columns
show the predicted increase in the overall smoking (baseline 32%) in ppt from the full model, from the
model when the friendship network is fixed, and from the model when the coefficients φ and h are set
to zero respectively. The last column shows the predicted change in the overall prevalence produced
from a model with no peer effects altogether, i.e. models which is estimated with no peer effects.
4 Policy experiments
4.1 A. Changes in the price of tobacco
The estimated model can serve as a numerical prototype to quantify the equilibrium response
of various (policy) changes of the decision environment and, more generally, to analyze the
determinants of teen smoking.47 Table 5 presents the effects of increases in tobacco prices
ranging from 15 to 150 cents (in the sample tobacco prices average at $1.67 for a pack).
The second through the fifth columns report predictions for the change in overall smoking
prevalence in percentage points for various scenarios. I consider the full model, the model
when the adjustment of the friendship networks is suppressed, the model where the peer
effects coefficients (φ and h) have been set to zero and, finally, the predictions from a model
which has been estimated without peer effects altogether.48
Table 5 shows that adolescents are sensitive to tobacco prices and that the social interac-
tions, including the response of the social network, amplifies the intended effect of increasing
tobacco prices. The baseline smoking in the sample is 32% so that an increase of $1.50 (about
90%) reduces the smoking to 16%. Comparison between model’s predictions with and without
47To assess the effect of each proposed policy, I consider 105 draws from the stationary distribution of the
model.
48Note that the scenario “PE off” entails stronger restrictions on individuals’ social environments than just
keeping friendships fixed. In particular, when simulating individuals’ smoking decisions, I keep constant their
friendship choices, their friends’ smoking statuses, and the average smoking behavior of the population overall
(i.e., the number of smokers in the population).
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friendship adjustments (columns two and three) reveals that the equilibrium response of the
friendship network to the proposed policies amplifies the intended effect of a price increases
by 10%, i.e. when high school students are free to adjust their peers, more students stop
smoking as a result of a price increase. As we discussed earlier, benefits of the direct effect
of increasing tobacco prices when students are free to reconstruct their friendships dominate
the benefits of the spillover effects when students are stuck with their friends.49 In addition,
comparison with predictions from the model when peer effects are switched off (columns
two and four) suggest that social interactions account for more than 70% of the decrease
in smoking following a price increase. Finally, note that if one is to completely discard our
equilibrium approach and rely on coarse correlations only,50 the predicted smoking decrease
is larger. This should not be surprising since the price coefficient in this case absorbs the
effect of the (omitted) peer influence (both aggregate and local) and, as we discussed earlier,
the bias is negative leading to overstating the magnitude of the price coefficient and whence
the predicted effect on smoking.
4.2 B. Changes in the racial composition of schools
Suppose that in a given neighborhood there are two racially segregated schools: “White
School” consisting of only white students and “Black School” consisting of only black students.
One would expect that the smoking prevalence in White school is much higher compared to
Black school because, in the sample, black high students smoke thee times less than white high
school students. Consider a policy aiming to promote racial desegregation, which prevents
schools from enrolling more than x percent of students of the same race. If such policy
is in place, will students from different races form friendships and will these friendships
systematically impact the overall smoking in one or another direction?
To simulate the effect of the proposed policy I consider one of the racially balanced schools
in my sample.51 TheWhites and the Blacks from this school serve as prototypes for the White
School and Black School respectively.52 To implement the proposed policy I randomly select
49Figuratively, a price change has two effects on the decision to smoke: the direct effect operates thor-
ough changing individuals’ exogenous decision environment and the indirect/spillover effect operates through
changing the peer norm which then puts additional pressure on the individuals’ to follow the change
50This could be implemented with the estimates from column one of table 2, which are obtained from a
specification restricting the peer effects coefficients at the stage of estimation.
51The school has 150 students of which 40% are Whites and 42% are Blacks. It incorporates students from
grades 7 to 12.
52As an alternative to splitting one school into two racially segregated schools, one could consider two schools
from the data that are already racially segregated. However, the only school with a high ratio of Blacks in the
sample incorporates students from grades 7 and 8. If this school serves as a prototype for the Black School,
then I am faced with two options for the choice of the White School. If the White School incorporates only 7th
and 8th graders, then smoking prevalence will be low regardless, since these grades are mostly nonsmoking.
Alternatively, if the White School incorporates higher grades, the simulation results will be driven in part by
the asymmetry in the population (7th and 8th graders do not make friends with students from higher grades).
Consequently, the school that incorporates black students in grades 7 and 8 only cannot properly serve as a
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Table 6: Predicted Smoking Prevalence following Same-race Students Cap
Same-race cap (%) School White School Black Overall
0 27.0 4.2 15.6
10 24.5 5.7 15.1
20 20.7 8.1 14.4
30 19.8 9.0 14.4
40 15.9 12.0 14.0
50 14.1 13.8 13.9
Note: A cap of x% same-race students is implemented with a swap of (100− x)% students.
a set of students from the White School and a set of students from the Black School and
swap them. For example to simulate the effect of a 70% cap on the same-race students in a
school, I need to simulate a swap of 30%.
Table 6 presents the simulation results, which suggest that racial composition affects the
overall smoking prevalence. The first column shows the size of the set of students which is
being swapped. The second, third, and forth columns show the simulated smoking prevalences
in the White School, Black School, and both, respectively. The table suggest that the overall
smoking prevalence in racially segregated schools (the first three rows of the last column) is
higher than that of racially desegregated schools (the bottom three rows of the last column).
Such a finding provides empirical support for policies promoting racial integration in the
context of fighting high smoking rates.
4.3 C. Cascade effects of an anti-smoking campaign
The smoking prevalence in the school with the highest smoking rate is 44.7%. For this school,
I consider the effects of an anti-smoking campaign that can prevent with certainty a given
number of students from smoking, e.g. a group of students are invited to a weekend-long
information camp on the health consequences of smoking. The camp is very effective in terms
of preventing students from smoking; however, it is too costly to engage all students. The
question is once the “treated students” come back what will happen: will their smoking friends
follow their example and stop smoking, or will their friends un-friend them and continue
smoking?
Table 7 presents the simulation results, which suggest that an anti-smoking campaign may
have a large impact on the overall prevalence of smoking, without necessarily being able to
directly engage a large part of the student population.53 In particular, the multiplier factor–
the ratio between the actual effect and effect constrained to the treated sub-population–
prototype for the Black School.
53The policy is simulated 103 times, where each time a new random draw of attendees is being considered.
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Table 7: Spillovers
Campaign (%) Smoking
Predicted effect Actual
Multiplier
proportional fixed network effect
- 46.4 - - - -
1.0 44.7 0.5 2.9 1.7 3.7
2.5 40.7 1.2 8.2 5.7 4.9
5.0 35.7 2.3 12.4 10.6 4.6
10.0 29.0 4.6 18.1 17.4 3.7
20.0 20.6 9.2 25.7 25.7 2.8
30.0 16.4 13.8 29.7 29.9 2.2
50.0 9.7 23.0 36.3 36.7 1.6
Note: The first column lists the alternative attendance rates. The second and third columns display
the smoking rate and the change in smoking rate respectively. The fourth column computes what
would have been the change of the smoking rate if the decrease would be proportional to the inter-
vention, i.e. computes a baseline without peer effects. The last column computes the ratio between
the percentage change in the number of smokers and the attendance rate. Note that that attendance
is random with respect to the smoking status of the students. If the campaign is able to target only
students who are currently smokers, the spillover effects will be even larger.
indicated a substantial spillover effects, operating through the social network, from those
who attended the camp to the rest of the school.
5 Concluding remarks
The premise of this paper is that social norms and behaviors are shaped jointly by a complex
process capable of generating a wide range of outcomes. I study this process through the lenses
of a novel family of equilibria, k-player Nash stability, and I approximate and empirically
analyze agents’ equilibrium play with the k-player dynamic. The empirical application of the
proposed framework to adolescents’ friendship selection and decisions to smoke makes the first
step in understanding the mechanisms and the opportunities for public policy arising from
the non-linear relationship between the social norms and individuals’ behaviors theorized
by Graham et al. (2014) and experimentally discovered in Carrell et al. (2013). Overall this
research formulates an avenue to study the complementarities and coordination in social
networks with accent on the possibility for multiple equilibrium outcomes.
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A Proofs
Proof (Lemma 1 (on p. 11)) For part (i), if S is k-PS then S|Ir is a Nash equilibrium of
Γ|Ir for any Ir such that |Ir| = k. If no player has incentive to deviate in Γ|Ir then no player
have incentive to deviate in Γ|I′r where I
′
r ⊆ Ir and r
′ < r. This establishes that any partition
with maximal component of size k is Nash stable. The converse follows mutatis mutandis.
Part (ii) follows from what we just established. If a state is partition Nash stable with respect
to any partition with maximum component of size k, it will certainly be partition Nash stable
with respect to a finer partition with smaller maximum component.
Proof (Proposition 1 (on p. 11)) The argument relies on showing that the normal form
game is a game with potential (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). This property has implication
not only for the existence results but also for the adaptive dynamic analysis.
Claim 1 The preferences given in (2) and (3) are summarized with the potential function
P : S×Xn −→ R :
P(S,X) =
∑
i
aiv(Xi) +
1
2
h
∑
i
∑
j
aiaj +
1
2
φ
∑
i
∑
j
aiajgijgji (10)
+
∑
i
∑
j
gijw (Xi,Xj) +
1
2
m
∑
i
∑
j
gijgji
+q
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k
(gijgjkgki
3
)
The claim is equivalent to following conditions:.
Condition A. For any i, S−i and X
P(S′,X) − P(S,X) = ui(S
′,X)− ui(S,X) (11)
where S, S′ ∈ S are defined as S = (ai = 0, S−i) and S
′ = (ai = 1, S−i).
Condition B. For any i 6= j, S−ij and X
P(S′,X) − P(S,X) = ui(S
′,X)− ui(S,X) (12)
where S, S′ ∈ S are defined as S = (gij = 0, S−ij) and S
′ = (gij = 1, S−ij).
The verification of these conditions is a matter of trivial algebra.
Proof (Proposition 2 (on p. 13) That any k-player Nash stable state is absorbing fol-
lows from the definition of S∗k−NS. The second part follows from the following claim:
Claim 2 The sequence of the values of the potential Pt induced by the outcome of a meeting
process of dimension k is a submartingale, i.e. E[Pt+1|St] ≥ Pt.
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So that {Pt} converges almost surely. Since the network is of finite size it follows that {Pt}
is constant for large t. Because of assumption 1 this can happen only if St ∈ S
∗
k−CS.
Proof (Theorem 1 (p. 14)) Note that the k-PD induces a finite state Markov chain which
is well-behaved: (i) irreducible, (ii) positive recurrent, and (iii) aperiodic. Then, the first part
of the theorem follows from standard results on convergence of Markov chains. To describe
the k-PD we need to integrate out the meeting process and obtain the one step transition
probabilities Pr(S′|S) for S, S′ ∈ Sn. In the end, we will show that Pr(S
′|S) exp{P(S)} =
Pr(S|S′) exp{P(S′)} so that, when properly normalized, exp{P(S)} is the stationary distri-
bution.
Let ∆(Sn) be the set of all probability distributions on Sn. Because Sn has no natural
ordering, one can think of p ∈ ∆(Sn) as a function p : Sn → R such that p(S) ≥ 0 and∑
p(S) = 1.54 Let Tk be the one step transition probability associated with k-PD. Tk a
linear operator on ∆(Sn).
Consider the case when Pr(S′|S) > 0.55 For fixed S, S′ ∈ Sn let MS′|S be the set of all
possible meeting outcomes which can result in state transitioning from S to S′. For example,
if S and S′ differ in the status of aii then MS′|S = {(aii, Ik−1)|Ik−1 = {i1, i2 . . . ık−1}, ij 6= i}.
Recall that Nk(S, µ) ⊂ Sn denotes the set of all possible outcomes of the meeting µ following
a state S. The proof follows from the following observations:56
Lemma 2 Let S, S′ ∈ Sn and µ = (i, Ik−1). Then
(i) MS′|S =MS|S′ for all S, S
′ ∈ Sn.
(ii) S′ ∈ Nk(µ, S) iff S ∈ Nk(µ, S
′).
(iii) If S′ ∈ Nk(µ, S) then Nk(µ, S) = Nk(µ, S
′).
Part (i) asserts that each meeting which can result in the state moving from S to S′ may
result in, provided the starting state were S′, the state moving from S′ to S. Part (ii) states
that if there is a meeting which can result in S transiting to S′, then there is a meeting which
can result in S′ transiting to S (note that by (i) we know this is the same meeting). Finally,
part (iii) notes that if a meeting µ could result in S transiting to S′, not only µ can result in
S′ transiting to S (by (i)), but also the set of all feasible states following µ and S coincides
with the set of all feasible states following µ and S′. From lemma 2, the one step transition
54The set ∆(Sn) can be extended and suitably equipped with an inner product, and shown to be a Hilbert
space, e.g. for a measure pi and f, g : Sn → R, let (f, g) =
∫
fgdpi and ‖f‖ =
√
(f, f). Then, it can be
shown that L2(pi) = {f : ‖f‖ < ∞} is a linear space, (., .) satisfy the axioms of inner product, and L2(pi) is
topologically closed.
55Out assumptions guarantee that Pr(S′, S) > 0 iff Pr(S, S′) > 0. Thus, if Pr(S′|S) = 0 then Pr(S|S′) = 0
and, trivially, Pr(S′|S) exp{P(S)} = Pr(S|S′) exp{P(S′)} holds.
56The formal proof involves basic reasoning revolving around the intuition behind these observations. The
challenging part is to state and interpret the lemma. Below I provide the interpretation while omitting the
proof which is available upon request.
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probability can be written as:
P(S) Pr(S′|S) = P(S)
∑
µ∈MS′ |S
Pr(µ)
exp{ui(S
′)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S)
exp{ui(Sˆ)}
(13)
= P(S)
∑
µ∈MS|S′
Pr(µ)
exp{P(S′)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S)
exp{P(Sˆ)}
(14)
= P(S′)
∑
µ∈MS|S′
Pr(µ)
exp{P(S)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S′)
exp{P(Sˆ)}
(15)
= P(S) Pr(S, S′) (16)
Formally this completes the proof and, for an illustration, I write down the transition
probability for the special case when S and S′ agree on all {gij}i 6=j but differ in aii for some
i, say S = (aii = 0, S−i) and S
′ = (a′ii = 1, S−i) (here S−i = {gij}i 6=j). Then we have
Pr(S′|S) =
∑
µ∈M|ii
Pr(µ)
exp{ui(S
′)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S)
exp{ui(Sˆ)}
where M|ii is the set of all possible meeting tuples (i, Ik−1) where player i meets different
Ik−1 ⊂ {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n}. Note that |M|ii| =
(
n−1
k−1
)
. In the case where all meeting
are equally likely and individuals are indifferent to all outcomes (i.e. ui is a constant), the
above reduces to
Pr(S′|S) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
1
n
(n−1
k−1
) 1
2k
=
1
n2k
Proof (Theorem 2 (p. 15)) Because there is no natural ordering of Sn, I will use func-
tions as opposed to vectors in the eigen problem. For I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n}, define
eI : Sn → R as
eI(S) =
∏
i 6=j∈I
(−1)gij
∏
i=j∈I
(−1)aij (17)
with e∅(S) = 1 for all S. Next, define
λk,I =
∑
i∈{(i,i)/∈I}
(n−1−|Ii|
k−1
)
n
(
n−1
k−1
) (18)
where Ii = {j : (i, j) ∈ I, i 6= j}
Lemma 3 There are 2n
2
pairs of (λk,I , ek,I) such that
(i)
∑
S ek,I(S)ek,I′(S) = 0 if I 6= I
′ and
∑
S ek,I(S)ek,I(S) = 2
n2
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(ii) For any S ∈ Sn
∑
S′
Pr(S′|S)eI(S
′) =
∑
(i,i)/∈I
(n−1−|Ii|
k−1
)
n
(n−1
k−1
) eI(S). (19)
More concisely TkeI = λIeI .
The first part of the lemma is trivial to verify. For the second part, we can write:
∑
Pr(S′|S)eI(S
′) =
∑
S′
∑
µ
Pr(µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S
′) (20)
=
∑
S′
∑
µ∈{µ∩I=∅}
Pr(µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S
′) + (21)
+
∑
S′
∑
µ∈{µ∩I 6=∅}
Pr(µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S
′) (22)
=
∑
S′
∑
µ∈{µ∩I=∅}
Pr(µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S
′) (23)
because
∑
µ∈{µ∩I 6=∅}
∑
S′∈Nk(S,µ)
Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S
′) = E[eI(S
′)|S, µ∩I 6= ∅] = 0. This summa-
tion involves 2k terms of Nk(S, µ). It is easy to see that for half of these terms eI(S
′) = eI(S)
and for the other half eI(S
′) = −eI(S).
Finally, note that eI(S) = eI(S
′) provided µ ∈ {µ ∩ I = ∅} so that for (23) we can write
∑
Pr(S′|S)eI(S
′) = eI(S) Pr(µ)
∑
S′
∑
µ∈{µ∩I=∅}
Pr(S′|S, µ) (24)
= eI(S)
1
n
(
n−1
k−1
) ∑
i∈{(i,i)/∈I}
(
n− 1− |Ii|
k − 1
)
(25)
because, by assumption, Pr(µ) = 1
n(n−1k−1)
and Pr(S′|S, µ) = Pr(S′′|S, µ) for S′, S′′ ∈Nk(S, µ).
With this the proof of the lemma is complete. To complete the proof of the theorem note
that λk,I are decreasing in |I|, so that the (second) smallest λk,I is achieved when I = {(i, j)}
with i 6= j.
Proof (Theorem 3 (p. 16) The proof follows immediately from the expression for the
stationary distribution obtained in theorem 1.
Proof (Proposition 3 (p. 17) I will proceed by a way of contradiction. Consider a net-
work with n = 2 players and suppose all coefficients except m are set to zero. In addition,
consider the subspace S of S consisting of the product of the linking strategies only:
S = {g12 = 0, g12 = 1} × {g21 = 0, g21 = 1}.
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Table 8: Example non-factorizability of π.
g21 = 0 g21 = 1
g12 = 0 1 1
g12 = 1 1 exp{w}
Table 8 shows the distribution π conditional on a1 = a2 = 0 on S up to a normalizing factor.
Clearly this matrix is full rank (its determinant is nonzero provided w 6= 0) and thus cannot
be factored into two independent marginals (i.e., play where individuals 1 and 2 randomize
independently).
Proof (Proposition 4 (p. 20) For fixed S, S′ ∈ Sn let KS′|S ⊂ {2, 3, . . . , n} be the set
of all possible meeting sizes consistent with transition from S to S′ of the k-PD. Recall
that, for fixed k, MS′|S is the set of all possible meeting outcomes which can result in state
transitioning from S to S′. The argument bellow follows from lemma 2, together with the
observation that KS′|S = KS|S′. Indeed, the unconditional proposal Q from the algorithm in
table 1 can be written as:
Q(S′|S) =
∑
k∈KS′|S
pk(k)
∑
µ∈MS′|S
Pr(µ)
1
|Nk(µ, S)|
(26)
=
∑
k∈KS|S′
pk(k)
∑
µ∈MS|S′
Pr(µ)
1
|Nk(µ, S)|
(27)
=
∑
k∈KS|S′
pk(k)
∑
µ∈MS|S′
Pr(µ)
1
|Nk(µ, S′)
(28)
= Q(S|S′)
B Data
B.1 Add Health Data
This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan
Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with
cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledg-
ment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design.
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Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health
website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received from grant
P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
B.2 Sample selection and sample statistics
This research uses data from Wave I of Add Health. The in-home questionnaire contains
44 sections collecting a wide array of information about adolescents. In particular, the data
contain information about adolescents’ friendship networks. Each respondent is asked to
nominate up to five of her best male and female friends. If individual A nominates individual
B as a friend, this does not imply that B nominates A. Indeed, only 36% of the friendships
in the saturated sample are reciprocal.57
In addition to the friendship network data, I use demographic data for the adolescents
(age, gender, grade, and race), for their home environments (presence of smoker in the house-
hold, pupil’s income and allowances, and mother’s education), and data for their smoking
behavior. The adolescent’s smoking status is deduced from the question, “During the past 30
days, on how many days did you smoke cigarettes?” and if the answer was one or more days,
the student’s smoking status is set to positive. Because all of the students in the saturated
sample were eligible for in-home interview, I have detailed information about student friends
as well.
As pointed earlier the schools from the saturated sample (16 schools out of 80) were
illegible for exhaustive survey. Since the size of the schools from this sample ranges from
20 to more than 1500, the smallest and the largest schools are dropped. After this still the
largest school in the sample enrolls more than 3 times more students compared to the second
largest. To maintain sample observations of comparable size (each school is an observation),
the largest school is split into grades 9, 10, 11, and 12 and, for this school, each grade is
treated as a separate network.58 In addition, schools with students only in grades 7 and 8
are dropped. Table 9 shows selected descriptive statistics for the estimation sample.
57Also, both the in-school and the in-home questionnaires contain data about best 5 male and best 5 female
friendships. For about 26% of the cases in the in-home sample, however, the interviewer asked only about
best 1 male and best 1 female friends. In these cases, to prevent the friendship network from being truncated,
I use friendship nominations data from the in-school sample whenever available.
58Less than 20% of the friendships are inter-grade so that this split does not affect substantially the friendship
network.
34
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for the Final Sample
Overall Min Max
Students 1634 44 234
Smoking 0.324 0.045 0.536
Male 0.504 0.346 0.581
Whites 0.861 0 0.989
Blacks 0.087 0 0.975
As-Hi-Ot 0.052 0 0.373
Price 166.8 137.3 220.1
Mom edu 0.747 0.684 0.939
HH smokes 0.452 0.092 0.609
Avg friends 2.432 0.273 3.503
Note: The final sample contains students from 12 high school networks.
C Background on tobacco smoking
Tobacco is the single greatest preventable cause of death in the world today.59 In the United
States alone, cigarette smoking causes approximately 443, 000 deaths each year (accounting
for one in every five deaths) and imposes an economic burden of more than $193 billion a year
in health care costs and loss of productivity. Approximately 1 million young people under 18
years of age start smoking each year; about 80% of adults who are smokers started smoking
before they were 18 (Kessler et al., 1996; Liang et al., 2001). Despite an overall decline in
smoking prevalence from 2005 to 2010, when the percentage of current smokers decreased
from 20.9% to 19.3%, the reduction in teen smoking has been less pronounced. In fact, the
proportions of 8th and 10th graders who smoke increased slightly in 2010. As with many
human behaviors, social interactions (peer influence) have often been pointed to as a major
driving force behind adolescent smoking choices.
59The World Health Organization, Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic (2008). The statistics for the
U.S. are compiled from reports by the Surgeon General (2010), National Center for Health Statistics (2011),
and Monitoring the Future (2011).
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